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It is well-known that classical models of belief are not realistic representations
of human doxastic capacity; equally, models of actions involving beliefs, such as
decisions based on beliefs, or changes of beliefs, suffer from similar inaccuracies.
In this paper, a general framework is presented which permits a more realistic
modelling both of instantaneous states of belief, and of the operations involving
them. This framework is motivated by the inadequacies of existing models, which
it overcomes, whilst retaining technical rigour in so far as it relies on known, nat-
ural logical and mathematical notions. As an illustration of this framework, it will
be applied to the particular case of belief revision. A model of belief revision shall
be obtained which, ￿rstly, recovers the G￿rdenfors postulates in a well-speci￿ed,
natural yet simple class of particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate
iterated revisions, recovering several proposed revision operators for iterated revi-
sionas specialcases; and￿nally, offersananalysisofRott’srecentcounterexample
to several G￿rdenfors postulates [23], elucidating in what sense it fails to be one of
the special cases to which these postulates apply.
Keywords Representationsofbelief, boundedrationality, logicalomniscience, aware-
ness, logical locality, belief dynamics, iterated revision, G￿rdenfors postulates, rational
choice theory, framing effect.
For several years now, the ￿realism￿ of the classical representations of beliefs proposed
by logicians, philosophers, and economists has been the source of anxiety and debate.
The realism of the models of doxastic actions which rely on such representations, such
as those models proposed by decision theory, choice theory, and, more recently, belief
revision, has given rise to similar worries. The purpose of this paper is to propose and
motivate a framework which supports a more realistic model of doxastic states, of the
changes they undergo, and of the role they play in action and decision. This framework
shall be developed and applied to the case of belief revision, a paradigm example of
an operation involving beliefs, and a ￿eld which has recently seen some concern about
the realism of traditional approaches.
Indeed, belief revision illustrates nicely the two aspects of the problem of realisti-
cally modelling beliefs and the operations in which they are involved. One concerns the
representation of states of belief: classical models ￿ be it as sets of possible worlds, or
sets of sentences closed under logical consequence ￿ which are accepted in traditional
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models of belief revision [10], suffer from well-known problems such as ￿logical om-
niscience￿, in so far as, loosely speaking, they imply that an agent believes all the
consequences of his beliefs [14, 6]. A second problem concerns the models of oper-
ations involving beliefs: in the case of belief revision, it is the traditional G￿rdenfors
postulates for belief revision, and corresponding models, which come under attack as
unrealistic. To take but one important example, Rott has recently given a purported
counterexample to two of the basic G￿rdenfors postulates for belief change [23]. His
counterexample is intended to cast doubt on the ￿realism￿ of these postulates, and thus
motivate the search for ￿more sophisticated models of belief formation￿.
This paper takes up Rott’s challenge, setting it in a wider stage. It assumes the
view that, given that the point of modelling belief is to use such models to capture
what happens to, and with, belief, and given furthermore that every model of what
happens to, and with, belief relies on a model of the states of belief, the question
of representing belief and the question of representing operations involving beliefs are
closely related. A model of a belief state will not be ￿sophisticated￿ if it cannot support
anequally￿sophisticated￿modelofbeliefdynamicsortheroleofbeliefindecisionand
action; conversely, a ￿sophisticated￿ model of belief change or of the role of belief in
action shall have to rely on a ￿sophisticated￿ model of the belief state at a particular
moment. The challenge is to propose a representation of belief which not only models
accurately the doxastic state of an agent at a particular moment, but also permits a
realistic model of the changes and effects of these beliefs. The proposed framework
shall have the machinery to deal with the alleged insuf￿ciencies of traditional theories,
both with respect to beliefs themselves, and with respect to the use and development of
these beliefs. In the case of belief revision, to which the proposed framework shall be
applied, this means that it provides not just ￿sophisticated models of belief formation￿,
but equally ￿sophisticated models of belief states￿.
The main concern of this article is to present the technical framework and to illus-
trate it on the particular case of belief revision; accordingly, a general discussion of
the perspective taken on beliefs, of the notion of ￿realistic￿ model, of the conception
of idealisation, and of related topics shall be reserved for another place. Suf￿ce it to
say that the proposed model shall be an improvement on the traditional framework,
as far as the question of realism is concerned, in two senses. Firstly, the motivation
and application of the model avoids the aforementioned problems with the traditional
frameworks. Secondly, the traditional models can be recovered as special cases: in this
concrete sense, they appear as idealisations of the more general, and realistic, frame-
work proposed here.
In the ￿rst part of the paper, the general framework shall be developed in two stages
￿ ￿rstly a representation of the instantaneous state shall be proposed and motivated,
then an operation capturing the dynamics of this state shall be de￿ned. In the second
part of the paper, the framework shall be applied to the case of belief revision. A model
of belief revision shall be obtained which, ￿rstly, recovers the G￿rdenfors postulates as
applying in particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate iterated revisions,
recovering several proposed revision operators for iterated revisions as special cases;
and ￿nally, offers an analysis of Rott’s aforementioned counterexample to several G￿r-
denfors postulates [23], elucidating in what sense it fails to be among the circumstances
to which these postulates apply.
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1 General framework
All systems purporting to represent beliefs or operations involving them assume an
underlying language, with its own logic (for the most part, the classical consequence
relation). The fundamental observation motivating the proposed model of beliefs is
that, between any two moments, the languages which are effective or ￿in play￿ at these
moments ￿ the languages in which the beliefs active at these moments are couched ￿
may differ. A similar point seems to hold for the logics of these languages, in so far
as they are comparable. Let us call the combination of language and logic effective at
a particular moment, the local logical structure at that moment. The model developed
shall be more ￿realistic￿ or ￿sophisticated￿ in that it pays explicit attention to and in-
deed represents formally the local logical structures effective at particular moments, as
well as the changes in these structures as new information comes into the fray.
In the ￿rst part of this section, a model of the local logical structure shall be moti-
vated and proposed; in Section 2, this model shall form the base of the representation
of the beliefs involved at that moment. Given that the local logical structure varies over
time, modelling the local logical structure at a particular moment will not suf￿ce: any
interesting approach must also capture the change in local logical structure when new
information comes into play. In the second part of this section, an operation shall be
de￿ned which shall be used to represent such changes; it shall be used, in Section 2 to
model belief dynamics.
1.1 Interpreted Algebras
The technical notion used to model local logical structures ￿ interpreted algebras ￿
can be motivated in two stages, loosely corresponding to two sorts of failure of logical
omniscience. Firstly, there is the important notion of a sentence or an issue being in
play at a particular moment. If, at time t, an agent believes (actively or explicitly) that
he has a meeting at 10.00, without apparently believing that he has a meeting at 10.00
and there are in￿nitely many primes, it is not just that there is no belief that there are
in￿nitely many primes, but rather that the whole question of the number of primes ￿ the
sentence ￿there are in￿nitely many primes￿, if you prefer ￿ is out of play at time t. To
give a more mundane example, if the agent forgets to go to his meeting, it is not that at
10.00 he believes there is no meeting, nor that at 10.00 he neither believes that there is
a meeting nor that there is no meeting, but rather that the subject of the meeting doesn’t
￿cross his mind￿. It doesn’t enter ￿into play￿.
Traditional models of belief cannot account for this notion of ‘in play’, because
they can only allocate one of three (doxastic) statuses to each sentence of the language
￿ believed to be true, believed to be false, or neither ￿ and the notion of ‘in play’ is
orthogonal to this triple distinction. Attempts to account for such phenomena have
generally consisted, somehow or other, in bringing in some sort of syntactic apparatus
to represent the sentences which are in play. Fagin and Halpern’s awareness models [6]
are classic examples of this: they extend the ordinary Hintikka-styled models of belief
with sets of sentences of which the agent is ￿aware￿, and allow (explicit) belief only
relative to these sentences. This is the moral to be taken from these sorts of examples:
to capture the local logical structure effective at a given moment, it is necessary to
render explicit the sentences in play at that moment. The set of sentences in play at a
particular moment shall henceforth be called the local language (at that moment).
A second important aspect of logical omniscience concerns the failure to recognise
the logical equivalence of sentences. An agent may accept that he needs to go to the
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eye-doctor without accepting that he need go to the ophthalmologist, despite the fact
that the two sentences are (intensionally) equivalent. This too cannot be represented in
the traditional framework, since these two sentences are instances of the same propo-
sition, or, to put it another way, they have the same truth values in all possible worlds.
Nor will the addition of sets containing sentences of which the agent is aware help in
this case, since the subject is aware of both sentences; he just does not recognise the
logical relationship between them. Suggestions for dealing with this sort of example
often consist of alterations to the semantic structure of the agent’s beliefs. The typical
example, dating back to [26], and proposed in [6] under the name of the ￿society of
minds model￿, models the belief state of the agent as a set of (consistent) sets of be-
liefs (that is, a set of sets of possible worlds). The agent’s belief state is fragmented
into consistent ￿clusters￿ ￿ or ￿minds￿ ￿ the simple union of which will usually be
inconsistent, thus his lack of logical omniscience. For example, in one of the agent’s
￿minds￿ (sets of beliefs), he believes that he needs to see the eye-doctor, in another, he
does not believe he needs to the see the ophthalmologist; the fragmentation into these
consistent ￿minds￿ prevents ￿logical￿ con￿ict between contradictory beliefs.
The moral of this sort of example shall be taken to be the need, when modelling
local logical structures, to represent accurately the logical relationships between sen-
tences, in so far as they ￿gure in that local logical structure at that moment. The
example shows that the local logical structure does not necessarily respect the global
logical structure pertaining to some global language.
These two aspects of the local logical structure ￿ the set of sentences in play and
the logical relationships between them in so far as they ￿gure in the local logical struc-
ture ￿ shall be captured by a model with a two-levelled structure. In the (classical)
propositional case which shall be considered here, the appropriate structure, called an
interpreted algebra, is de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 1 (Interpreted Algebra). An interpreted algebra B is a triple (BI,B,q),
where:
• BI is the free Boolean algebra generated by a set I (the interpreting algebra);1
• B is a Boolean algebra (the base algebra);
• q : BI → B is a surjective Boolean homomorphism.
An element of B is a pair (φ,q(φ)), φ ∈ BI. Elements of an interpreted algebra
shall be referred to (without risk of confusion) by the appropriate elements of the in-
terpreting algebra, and, for this reason, shall often be called ￿sentences￿. The set of
elements of B shall be denoted |B|. (|B|,∧,¬,>) is the Boolean algebra on |B|, in-
duced by the Boolean structure on the interpreting algebra BI (the ordinary Boolean
connective symbols ∧,∨,¬,→ shall be used when speaking of this structure, with ∧
and ¬ taken as primitive for the purposes of de￿nitions and proofs).
Finally, the consequence relation ⇒ on |B| is de￿ned as follows:
∀ φ, ψ ∈ |(BI,B,q)|, φ ⇒ ψ iff q(φ) 6 q(ψ)
⇔ will designate the derived equivalence relation.
1A Boolean algebra is a distributed complemented lattice; the order will be written as 6, meet, join,
complementation and residuation as ∧,∨,¬,→, the top and bottom elements as > and ⊥. The free Boolean
algebra generated by a set X shall be noted as BX for the rest of the paper; details on this and the other
notions used in this paper may be found in [17].
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Explication This structure can be understood in the following way.
The interpreting algebra models the local language effective at the moment in ques-
tion, with I being the set of locally atomic sentences in play at that moment. It is, so to
speak, the ￿syntax￿ of the local logical structure.
The base algebra is the local logic on this language. It is, so to speak, the ￿seman-
tics￿ of the local logical structure. Just as the elements of the interpreting algebra may
be thought of as the sentences of the local logical structure, the elements of the base
algebra may be thought of as the (local) propositions. Accordingly, q is the map tak-
ing sentences to propositions, and may be thought of as the valuation of the sentences
of the language.2 Elements of the interpreted algebra consist of a sentence and the
proposition which it expresses; the Boolean connectives are operators on the sentences
(and, via q, on the propositions), whereas the consequence relation on elements of the
interpreted algebra arises from relations between the propositions they express. Non
trivial logical equivalences between sentences (cf. the eye-doctor / ophthalmologist ex-
ample above) are modelled by the fact that the two sentences express the same (local)
proposition; that is, they are mapped to the same element of B by q.
Given that the local logical structure is, in practice, ￿nite, the interpreting algebra,
and thus the base algebra, are ￿nite (see below), and therefore atomic.3 The atoms of
the base algebra can be thought of as ￿states￿ or ￿small worlds￿ ￿ worlds in the sense
that every sentence of the local language receives a valuation in each world (thanks to
q); small in the sense that only the sentences of the local language receive any valuation
in these worlds. Although the algebraic perspective on the semantics (ie. treating
B as the algebra of local propositions) shall prove more fruitful for modelling the
dynamics of local logical structures, the extensional view (ie. treating B as the sets of
small worlds) will sometimes permit a more concise ￿ and for some, more intuitive ￿
discussion.
It is worth mentioning several assumptions that are ￿ and aren’t ￿ implicit in this
model and in particular, in the use of a free Boolean algebra (BI) to model the local
language. Firstly, the local language is assumed to be closed under ordinary linguistic
connectives such as ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’. Philosophically, this seems a harmless assump-
tion: if the sentence ￿you have a meeting at 10.00￿ is in play, and the sentence ￿there
are in￿nitely primes￿ is in play, then the sentence ￿you have a meeting at 10.00 and
there are in￿nitely primes￿ is in play.
Secondly, and more importantly, in this model, these connectives on elements of
the interpreted algebra retain their ordinary Boolean properties; so for example, if the
sentence ￿you have a meeting at 10.00￿ is in play, then the sentence ￿you do have
a meeting at 10.00 and you don’t have a meeting at 10.00￿ is contradictory. This
assumption is both technically and philosophically less audacious than it may seem at
￿rst.
Technically, a more evident model of the local language, which does not involve
these assumptions, is a so-called ￿term algebra￿.4 However, since such an algebra
would have to be mapped into the Boolean algebra B (the base algebra) in such a way
that the connectives are taken to the Boolean operators, this mapping ends up factoring
2The fact that it is a Boolean homomorphism guarantees that the ordinary conditions on valuations are
satis￿ed.
3Standard terminology is employed here: an atom of a Boolean algebra is an element a ∈ B, such that,
for all x ∈ B, ⊥ 6 x 6 a, either x = ⊥ or x = a. Note furthermore that the assumption of ￿niteness
is not required for any of the de￿nitions or results in this paper; the weaker assumption that B is atomic is
suf￿cient.
4For example, [4, Ch 5].
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through the interpreting algebra BI. Most of the framework presented here can be
expressed, in a messier and less transparent fashion, in terms of term algebras.
Asfarasthephilosophical￿or￿realistic￿￿credentialsofthismodelareconcerned,
one might question the extent to which the connectives involved at a particular moment
do satisfy the ordinary Boolean conditions. To ease this worry, it should be noted that
no suppositions have been put on the set I of locally atomic, or primitive, sentences.
These sentences are those taken to be primitive at the particular moment and in the par-
ticular situation in question, and certainly not in any deeper or larger sense. Therefore,
the model can account for a connective featuring in a sentence which does not obey the
Boolean properties by taking the whole sentence, rather than the appropriate clauses,
as an element of I. If ￿it is cold and it is wet￿ is in play, it does not necessary mean
that ￿it is cold￿ and ￿it is wet￿ are individually implied; indeed, they may not even be
in play as separate linguistic entities. The assumption that the connectives satisfy the
ordinary Boolean conditions is rather weaker than it seems at ￿rst blush, since it only
applies to those connectives connecting sentences which themselves ￿gure in the local
language.
In defence of the assumption, it does have the advantage of reducing the size of
the local language: although recursive application of Boolean connectives on the ele-
ments of (a non-empty set) I yields an in￿nite set, the set of equivalence classes under
Boolean equivalence ￿ that is, the set of elements of BI ￿ will be much smaller, and
may be ￿nite. This seems a faithful rendering of the intuition that the local language at
a particular moment is, in practice, ￿nite: not only are there a ￿nite number of (locally)
primitive sentences in play (I is ￿nite), but there are effectively only a ￿nite number of
linguistic entities which can be formed from them, since one naturally discounts such
differences as those between ‘A and A and A and A’ and ‘A’. As noted above, in this
paper, the interpreted algebras shall be taken to be ￿nite.
Furthermore, the model of the local language as a free algebra ensures that no
relationships on the elements of the algebra other than the ordinary Boolean ones are
assumed. If a non free algebra were used, it would represent the sentences as entering
into such non trivial (ie. non Boolean) relationships; by using a free algebra, it follows
that the only non trivial relationships between sentences are those arising from the
relationships between the local propositions they express, that is, those expressed in
terms of the consequence ⇒.
Here are three examples of basic, but important, sorts of interpreted algebra.
Example 1. A trivial interpreted algebra B is an algebra of the form (BI,0,q), where
0 is the one-element Boolean algebra (> = ⊥) and q : BI 7→ >.
The point interpreted algebra for the sentence φ, Bφp = (B{φ},1,q), where 1 is
the two element Boolean algebra ({>,⊥}), and q : φ 7→ >.
The simple interpreted algebra for the sentence φ, Bφ = (B{φ},2,q), where 2 is
the four element Boolean algebra ({>,⊥,x,x0}), and q : φ 7→ x.5
Trivial algebras are the inconsistent local logical structures. All (and only) the
sentences of the local language are equivalent to the (local) true (and, equally, to the
local false).
Point algebras and simple algebras are the two basic possibilities for representing
a (consistent) local logical structure which has essentially one sentence (φ) in play
(that is, there is the one sentence and those which can be formed from it with Boolean
connectives). In the point algebra, this sentence is accepted as a (local) logical truth in
5Recall (footnote 1) that B{φ} is the free Boolean algebra generated by {φ}.
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the language (in terms of small worlds, there is one world, where φ holds, ¬φ holding
at no world in this interpreted algebra). The simple algebra admits the ￿possibility￿
that the sentence may be true as well as false (there are two worlds, one where φ holds,
the other where ¬φ holds).
Finally, it is easy to see that this sort of model accommodates naturally the two
sorts of phenomena related to the lack of logical omniscience described above. On the
one hand, the fact for sentences to be in or out of play (cf. the example of the meeting
and the number of primes) is captured by their presence or absence with respect to the
interpreting algebra. On the other hand, logical inconsistencies relative to sentences
which are both in play is captured by the structure of the base algebra (and the homo-
morphism into this algebra): in such an algebra, the global logical relationship between
sentences (those referring to eye-doctor and those referring to ophthalmologist express
the same propositions) is not respected. Although it will divert us from the topic of this
paper to elaborate the point, it should be noted that this model has the advantage over,
say, the families of models proposed in [6], of capturing both of these phenomena in a
single framework. A more important advantage lies however in the ease of modelling
changes in the local logical structure ￿ a question which is seldom posed in the litera-
ture on logical omniscience and realistic models of belief. This is the question which
shall now be addressed.
1.2 Fusion
Investment in a model which captures the logical imperfectness of an agent’s instan-
taneous belief state seems worthless if it is not accompanied by an account of how
this state can change. If a model captures the ￿awareness￿ of an agent at a moment, it
should surely account for the frequent changes of awareness from one moment to the
next. If it models the agent’s ￿several minds￿, it should equally yield an understanding
of how these ￿minds￿ interact with each other over time. In terms of the framework
proposed here, a proposed model of the local logical structure at particular moments
is of little use unless it can also model the changes in the local logical structure which
occur from one moment to the next. In this section, a fusion operation shall be de￿ned
which will model the change in the local logical structure as new information comes
into play.
The changes to local logical structures which shall be dealt with here are those
brought about by the incoming information. Typically, in models of belief (or knowl-
edge) and their changes, new information comes in the form of a sentence (or set of
sentences) of the language.6 However, no global or overarching language is assumed
in the current framework; indeed, given that the only language present is the local lan-
guage of the current local logical structure, the whole problem is how to deal with
sentences which do not necessarily belong to this language. It is therefore necessary
to endow the incoming information with its own fragment of language, with the sort
of basic logical structure which always accompanies such fragments of language. To
put it another way, the new information comes in the form of (at least) a local language
with a local logic. It shall thus be modelled using interpreted algebras.7
6This is the case not only in belief revision [10], but equally in epistemic dynamic logic (for example, the
case of public announcements [8, 28]), or in typical Bayesian update theory [24].
7It should be recalled that the current discussion concerns the general framework; in Section 2.2.2, a
richer model of new information, obtained by adding extra structure to the interpreted algebra, shall be
proposed.
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The ￿exibility of the notion of interpreted algebra permits it to capture the diverse,
more or less complicated, forms which incoming information might take. At one end
of the spectrum, rich local languages (large BI) with interesting logical structures (B
and q) can accurately model an input which does not consist of a simple sentence, but
comprises a complex of diverse information, about how such a sentence comes into
play, how it was learnt, what justi￿es it, and so on. At the other end of the spectrum,
thesimpletraditionalcasesofasinglesentenceenteringintoplaycanbecapturedusing
simple or point interpreted algebras (Example 1).
Once new information is modelled by an interpreted algebra, the change in the face
of new information takes the form of an operation (or operations) sending a pair of
interpreted algebras ￿ one modelling the current local logical structure, the other the
new information ￿ to another interpreted algebra ￿ the local logical structure resulting
from the input of the new information. There is, however, one ￿nal aspect that needs
to be taken into account before such an operation can be proposed.
Given that no overarching language is assumed, but only the local languages con-
tained in the individual interpreted algebras, there is a priori no way of identifying
sentences belonging to different interpreted algebra. However, when new information
comes into play, it could certainly be the case that some of the sentences involved be-
long to the local logical structure already in play. The representation of the prior local
logical structure and the new information by interpreted algebras cannot account for
the fact that the two may have certain sentences in common: supplementary technical
apparatus is required to capture this. The identi￿cation of sentences between different
interpreted algebras shall be represented using an appropriate relation ￿ called identi￿-
cation ￿ de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 2 (Identi￿cation between algebras). For B1 = (BI1,B1,q1), B2 =
(BI2,B2,q2) two interpreted algebra, '⊂ |B1|×|B2| is an identi￿cation of sentences
between the two algebras if:
(i) ' is the restriction of an equivalence relation on |B1| ] |B2|, to |B1| × |B2|,
where ] is the disjoint union;
(ii) ' respects the Boolean connectives:
• if φ ' φ0, ψ ' ψ0, then φ ∧ ψ ' φ0 ∧ ψ0;
• if φ ' φ0, then ¬φ ' ¬φ0;









k∈Kn ψk), ψk ∈ I2, the normal disjunctive conjunctive
forms for φ and ψ, there is a bijection µ between M and N, and bijections σm
between Jm and Kµ(m) for every m ∈ M, such that, ∀m ∈ M,∀j ∈ Jm, φj ∼
ψσµ(m)(j).8
Remark 1. Clause (i) is expressed in this form because it clari￿es the extensions of
the notion to cases of more than two interpreted algebra and to the case of a single
interpreted algebra (see below). An equivalent formulation would be, for φ,φ0 ∈ |B1|,
ψ,ψ0 ∈ |B2|, if {χ|φ ' χ} ∩ {χ|φ0 ' χ} 6= ∅, then {χ|φ ' χ} = {χ|φ0 ' χ}, and if
{π|π ' ψ} ∩ {π|π ' ψ0} 6= ∅, then {π|π ' ψ} = {π|π ' ψ0}.
8Ie. φ and ψ have the same disjunctive conjunctive form, with equivalent elements of I1 and I2. For
the existence of disjunctive conjunctive form in free Boolean algebras, see any basic logic textbook. This
condition guarantees that the top elements of the two algebras are identi￿ed: > ' >.
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In keeping with the spirit of this de￿nition, a notion of identi￿cation relation on
sentences of a single interpreted algebra may be de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 3. An identi￿cation relation on B is a congruence relation on (|B|,∧,¬,>)
generated by an equivalence relation on I, in the sense of (iii) above.9
An extended discussion of the philosophical consequences of identi￿cations be-
tween local logical structures will have to be left for another paper. Here it is only
important to understand the consequence for the question of changes in the local log-
ical structure in the face of new information: the task now becomes that of proposing
an operation taking two interpreted algebras, with an identi￿cation of sentences be-
tween them, and yielding an interpreted algebra which respects the identi￿cation of
the sentences. The operation of fusion of interpreted algebras does just this. It can be
de￿ned from two simple operations on interpreted algebras (which are little more than
operations on Boolean algebras lifted to interpreted algebras).
The ￿rst is the operation of free product on interpreted algebras.
De￿nition 4 (Free Product of interpreted algebras). The free product of interpreted
algebras B1 = (BI1,B1,q1) and B2 = (BI2,B2,q2) is B1 ⊗ B2 = (BI1]I2, B1 ⊗
B2, q1⊗q2), where ⊗ is the free product on Boolean algebras and Boolean homomor-
phisms respectively.10
At the level of languages, the new local language obtained is the closure under
Boolean operations of the disjoint union of the two initial local languages. On the
semantic side, the set of small worlds or states in the resulting interpreted algebra is
the cartesian product of the sets of small worlds or states of the initial algebras11; the
valuationontheseworlds(thehomomorphism q)isthenaturallyderivedvaluation. The
free product adds the initial local languages, without identifying any of the sentences,
and combines the small worlds of the initial algebras, so to speak, to obtain ￿enriched￿
small worlds, without imposing any additional logical structure on these worlds.
The operation used to identify or render identical elements of algebras is the well-
known operation of quotient. In the current case, it is de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 5 (Quotient of an interpreted algebra). The quotient of an interpreted
algebra B = (BI,B,q) by a identi￿cation relation ' on B, is the algebra B/ ' =
(BI/ ', B/ 'q, q'), where
- B/ ∼ is the quotient of the ordinary Boolean algebra B by the congruence rela-
tion ∼;
- ' is the congruence relation on BI induced by the relation ' on elements of B
(φ ' ψ iff (φ,q(φ)) ' (ψ,q(ψ)));









k∈Kn ψk), φj, ψk ∈ I, the normal disjunctive conjunctive forms for φ and ψ, there is a
bijection µ between M and N, and bijections σm between Jm and Kµ(m) for every m ∈ M, such that,
∀m ∈ M,∀j ∈ Jm, φj ∼ ψσµ(m)(j).
10BI1]I2 = BI1 ⊗ BI2, so the free product of interpreted algebras is just the free product of the
interpreting and base algebras, with the free product of the homomorphisms. This is thus a well-de￿ned
operation on interpreted algebras. For details on the technical notions, see [17].
11For atomic algebras B1 and B2, with sets of atoms S1 and S2 respectively, B1 ⊗B2 is atomic with its
set of atoms isomorphic to S1 × S2.
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- 'q is the smallest congruence relation on B containing '0, where X '0 Y iff
∃φ,ψ ∈ BI, q(φ) = X, q(ψ) = Y, and φ ' ψ;12
- q'([φ]') = [q(φ)]'q.
Observation 1. The quotient of an interpreted algebra by an identi￿cation relation is
well-de￿ned.13
Two different elements of a Boolean algebra which are related by a congruence
relation are taken, under the quotient with respect to this relation, to the same element
in the resulting algebra. In terms of local languages, the quotient operation identi￿es
the sentences which were '-equivalent in the initial local language; that is to say,
such sentences in BI have a common image in BI/ '. In terms of the local logic,
the propositions corresponding to sentences which are '-equivalent in the initial local
logical structure are identi￿ed in the resultant structure; that is, they have the same
image. Equivalently, quotienting on the semantic level removes the small worlds which
are witness to differences between any pair of '-equivalent sentences φ and ψ; that is,
worlds where the valuations of φ and ψ differ.14
The free product of two interpreted algebras puts them together, without identifying
any of the sentences between them. The quotient identi￿es sentences which are '-
equivalent in an interpreted algebra. The operation of fusing two interpreted algebra,
whilst respecting the identi￿cation of sentences between them, would seem to require
exactly these two steps. Such an operation will model the change in the local logical
structure in the face of incoming information. The following preliminary de￿nition is
required.
De￿nition 6. If ' is an identi￿cation relation between B1 and B2, let '0⊂ B1 ⊗ B2
be {(e1(φ),e2(ψ)) | (φ,ψ) ∈'}, where e1 (resp. e2) is the canonical homomorphism
from B1 (resp. B2) into B1 ⊗ B2. Let ¯ ' be the smallest congruence relation on
B1 ⊗ B2 containing '0.15
It is easily seen that ¯ ' is an identi￿cation relation on B1 ⊗ B2. Furthermore, it is
the natural identi￿cation relation on B1 ⊗B2 generated by the relation ' between B1
and B2.16 It allows the following de￿nition of the fusion of two interpreted algebras.
De￿nition 7 (Fusion ∗). Given two interpreted algebras B1 and B2, with an identi￿-
cation relation ' between them, the fusion of the two algebras respecting this relation
is de￿ned as:
B1 ∗' B2 = (B1 ⊗ B2)/¯ '
In subsequent discussion, identi￿cation relations shall generally be assumed be-
tween appropriate interpreted algebras, and the fusions written simply as B1 ∗ B2.
12In other words, 'q is the closure under the appropriate conditions of '0, which fails to be a congruence
relation because it is not transitive.
13Proofs of this and other statements are to be found in the appendix.
14Formally: the x with x 6 q(φ) 4 q(ψ), where 4 is the symmetric difference, are removed in the
quotient operation.
15In other words, ¯ ' is the closure of '0 under Boolean operations, re￿exivity, transitivity and symmetry.
16This can be seen from the fact that ¯ ' is unique in the following sense: if '00 is an identi￿cation relation
on B1 ⊗ B2 satisfying e1 × e2(') = '00 |e1×e2(|B1|×|B2|), then '00= ¯ '.
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This operation models the change in the local logical structure under new incom-
ing information: both the original local logical structure and the new information are
modelled by interpreted algebra; the resulting local logical structure is the resulting
interpreted algebra. This model is intuitive: in fusing the new information (with its
fragment of language) with the existing logical structure, the ￿sum￿ of the two lan-
guages is taken (free product), and then appropriate sentences ￿guring in the different
languages are identi￿ed (the quotient). Given that the operation to be modelled is that
of ￿merging￿ or ￿combining￿ two fragments of language, one would expect it to be
commutative: no priority should be given to one over the other.17 The operation ∗ has
this property.
Examples and relation to the literature Two examples shall serve to illustrate this
sort of operation.
Example 2. For φ in B, the fusions with the relevant simple and point algebras (Ex-
ample 1) are as follows:
Simple algebra B ∗ Bφ is isomorphic to B;
Point algebra B ∗ Bφp is isomorphic to (BI,B/(φ),q0), where B/(φ) is the quotient
ofB bythesmallestcongruencerelationsuchthat φ ' >, andq0 thecomposition
of q with the quotient homomorphism.
The ￿rst example illustrates that the fact of bringing into play a sentence which is
already in play, in such a way that no extra logical structure is allocated to it, does not
alter the algebra. As one would expect, the fusion operation does not change anything
when the fusion is with something already present.
The second example concerns fusion with a sentence already in play, but such that
the sentence, in so far as it ￿gures as new information, is endowed with extra logical
structure: namely, it is taken to be equivalent to the true (of the local language). This
leads to a change in the local logical structure to accommodate this information: the
fusion results in a logical structure with the same local language, but such that the
sentence is now equivalent to the true (or alternatively true in all small worlds).
This second example is interesting because, put in terms of small worlds, it essen-
tially says that fusion with Bφp does not change the language but removes all the small
possible worlds, or states, where φ is false. This sort of operation, which plays an
important role in the literature on public announcement and dynamic epistemic logic
[8, 28], is thus reproduced as a special case in the framework proposed here. More
generally still, it is not dif￿cult to see that the model of epistemic programs proposed
by Baltag [2, 3] is based on the sort of fusion operation proposed here.18 Further dis-
cussion of the relationship with this work and its consequences shall be left for another
paper.
The task of this section was to propose a model for the local logical structure ef-
fective at a particular moment, and of the dynamics of this structure. The notion of
17Recall that only the logico-linguistic structures in which beliefs and new information are couched are
being considered at this point. Fusions of such structures are expected to treat the two structures equally.
This does not mean that the revision of beliefs by new information should not prioritise one over the other;
indeed, the model of beliefs and new information proposed in the Section 2.2 shall give priority to the new
information.
18Leaving aside the locality of languages, which is not present in [2, 3], and modalities, which are not
(yet) present in the basic framework proposed here, Baltag’s Update product and the operation of Fusion
de￿ned above turn out to be essentially the same.
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interpreted algebra captures the local logical structure in play, in such a way that it
can account for some of the most pressing logical imperfections in our beliefs and be-
haviour, such as the phenomena of awareness and lack of recognition of intensional
equivalence. The operation of fusion of interpreted algebras models the change of the
local logical structure under incoming information.
This framework is abstract, and intentionally so. It can be applied to several dif-
ferent questions in several different ￿elds; in each, the basic notions may assume a
different philosophical interpretation. Examples of applications may include context
and conversation, knowledge and communication, belief and decision, counterfactuals
and nonmonotonic logic. And belief and its revision. The next section, intended to
be an extended example of the application of this sort of framework to phenomena al-
ready considered by logicians, will propose a model of belief and belief revision which
is based on the general framework introduced above.
2 Belief revision
2.1 Introduction and state of play
Amodelofbeliefrevisionconsistsof(1)amodelofthebeliefstate, (2)arepresentation
of new information with which the state is to be revised, and (3) a revision operation
representing the revision of the former by the latter, enjoying appropriate properties.
Firstly, the operation is generally taken to satisfy a certain number of belief revision
postulates, of which the most popular are the so-called G￿rdenfors postulates [1, 10];
furthermore, one often expects the framework to be general enough to accommodate
any revision operation which satis￿es these postulates (it supports a representation the-
orem). Typically, in the AGM paradigm, the state of belief is taken to be a set of
sentences (of a given language L) closed under a (given) logical consequence relation,
and the new information consists of a sentence of this language [1, 10].19 A popular
model of belief revision in this paradigm, proposed by Grove [9], will serve as a useful
example. It uses a (re￿exive) order ¹ on the set S of maximal consistent sets of a lan-
guage L ￿ or if you prefer, possible worlds with respect to L ￿ which has the following
properties:
(S ¹ 1) ¹ is connected (∀x,y ∈ S, x ¹ y or y ¹ x);
(S ¹ 2) ¹ is transitive;
(S ¹ 3) ¹ is ￿nitarily stoppered: for all φ ∈ L, |φ| 6= ∅ implies that {x ∈ |φ| | x ¹
y ∀y ∈ |φ|} 6= ∅, where |φ| = {x ∈ S| x ² φ} (that is, the set of worlds
where φ is true).
Such an order shall henceforth be called a Grove order.
In this model, the set of beliefs are the set of sentences true in the ¹-minimal
worlds. A sentence ψ is believed after revision by φ if it is true in all the ¹-minimal
worlds satisfying φ. This model satis￿es the G￿rdenfors postulates (and supports a
representation theorem with respect to them).20
19In AGM theory, the operation of contraction ￿ removal of a belief ￿ is taken as primitive. Here only the
question of belief revision shall be dealt with; contraction can be recovered, if appropriate care is taken, with
the help of the Harper identity. See [10] for details.
20For the uninitiated, it may be useful to compare this model with Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals
[18]; for a detailed comparison, see [9].
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Since the original models of belief revision were proposed, two other desirable
properties of models of belief revision have come to fore. On the one hand, there
is the question of iterated belief: it is desirable to have a model such that, whatever
results from the revision of belief, it can itself be revised in the face of subsequent
information. The traditional AGM models, and indeed the Grove model described
above, do not satisfy this condition. The Grove model, for example, yields a set of
sentences after revision, but no order ¹0 on S which would be appropriate for use
in further revision. Since then, several models supporting iterated revision, and indeed
various postulates on iterated revisions which these models satisfy, have been proposed
[5, 25, 19, 16, 22]. It is a generally accepted desideratum for models of belief revision
that they permit iterated revisions, and therefore satisfy at least some of the proposed
postulates.
A second sort of development has already been mentioned: the question of the re-
alism of the proposed theories of belief revision. Doubts over this issue have taken
several forms: some of the debates have been localised to the validity of particular
postulates [20, 21], whereas other authors have seen a general need for more ￿sophis-
ticated￿ or ￿realistic￿ models which give a general account of the apparent failings of
certain postulates in particular situations and the apparent idealisations underpinning
traditional models. Hansson [12] counts as the ￿rst problem of belief revision that of
￿nding models which are more faithful to the ￿niteness of agents; Rott [23] proposes
his counterexample to two of the G￿rdenfors postulates in order to motivate a search
for more ￿sophisticated￿ models of belief and belief change. It is incumbent upon any
modelseekingtocapturemoreaccuratelysuchphenomena, suchasthemodelproposed
in this paper, to show how it deals with such problematic examples. Rott’s counterex-
ample shall be taken as a test case: a model should make it clear to what extent the
G￿rdenfors postulates hold, and why they do not seem to hold in this counterexample.
In the following section, a model of belief revision shall be proposed. In Section
2.3, it shall be shown how this theory satis￿es the desiderata for models of belief re-
vision mentioned above: it satis￿es the G￿rdenfors postulates in appropriate cases, it
models iterated revision and recovers iterated revision operations proposed in the lit-
erature as special cases, and it supports an enlightening, ￿sophisticated￿ analysis of
Rott’s counterexample.
2.2 A model of belief revision
2.2.1 Belief states
In Section 1.1, a model of the local logical structure effective at a particular moment
was proposed, in the form of what was called interpreted algebra. The locality of this
language (not all sentences of some accepted overarching language are contained in an
interpreted algebra), and of its logic (the logical consequence at play in the interpreted
algebra does not necessary coincide with some global or absolute notion of logical
consequence) respond well to certain limits in real agents’ belief states. The basic pro-
posal for modelling the belief state of an individual is to employ traditional models of
beliefs, but, instead of using some ￿xed language and logical structure, considering the
beliefs of the agent at a particular moment as couched in a local logical structure which
is effective at that moment. This is, so to speak, a model of the beliefs of which the
agent is ￿aware￿, in the agent’s own language, at a particular moment. Philosophical
discussion of the consequences of this perspective on modelling beliefs shall be left for
another paper; here, concern shall centre mainly on details of the model.
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The simplest model of beliefs would be, following the tradition, as a set of sen-
tences closed under logical consequence ￿ that is, the logical consequence of the local
logical structure which is operative at the appropriate moment.21 However, it has been
suggested that correct representations of the belief states (sometimes called ￿epistemic
states￿) of an individual should include information not only about his current beliefs,
but also about how he would revise them, or, alternatively, about how ￿entrenched￿
they are [5]. Such a model of belief states shall be employed. It consists in adding a
Grove order ￿ representing not only the agent’s beliefs but potential revisions of these
beliefs ￿ to an interpreted algebra ￿ representing the local logical structure in play at
the moment in question. The resulting structure is called an ordered algebra.
De￿nition 8 (Ordered algebra). An ordered algebra is a pair (B,¹) where B =
(BI,B,q) is an interpreted algebra and ¹ is a re￿exive order on the atoms of B which
is connected, transitive and ￿nitarily stoppered (conditions (S ¹ 1-3)).22
Here are three examples of ordered algebra (see Example 1 for terminology and
notation).
Example 3. For any trivial interpreted algebra B, (B,¹0) is a trivial ordered algebra,
where ¹0 is the empty order.
The point ordered algebra for sentence φ, (Bφp,¹φp) has, for interpreted algebra,
the point algebra for φ, and, for order, the only possible one.
The simple ordered algebra for sentence φ, (Bφ,¹φ), has, for interpreted algebra,
the simple algebra for φ, and, for order, the order favouring φ: q(φ) ¹ q(¬φ).
Explication Ordered algebras provide subtle models of the agent’s doxastic states, in
that they permit, for any given sentence, a range of ￿doxastic statuses￿. To clarify the
discussion, a little preliminary terminology will prove useful.
De￿nition 9. For an element X of the base algebra of an interpreted algebra B =
(BI,B,q), let |X| = {φ ∈ B|q(φ) > X}.23
The centre of an ordered algebra (B,¹), denoted |(B,¹)|, is |{x| x ¹-minimal}|;
that is, the set of elements of B true in all the small worlds minimal with respect to
¹. The centre of a trivial ordered algebra (B0,¹0) shall be taken to be the set of its
elements.
An element A ∈ |B| is a generator if q(A) = {x| x ¹-minimal}.24 In a trivial
ordered algebra, every element is a generator.
An element A ∈ |B| is a local tautology if q(A) = >.25 All the elements of a
trivial ordered algebra are local tautologies.
Forasentence φinanorderedalgebra (B,¹), therearetwogeneralsensesinwhich
it may be ￿believed￿. It might in the centre of the algebra; furthermore, it may be a
21Thismodelimpliesthattheagentis locally logicallyomniscient. However, thisseemsagenerallycorrect
assumption: if an agent believes ‘A’, ‘if A, then B’, recognises these beliefs as such, and ‘B’ is in play, then
it would seem that he believes ‘B’.
22Given that, in general, the interpreted algebra involved here are ￿nite, the condition (S ¹ 3) is redundant.
It is retained for coherence.
23Recall that > is the order of the Boolean algebra. In traditional notation (read for example in terms
of small worlds), this de￿nition would be expressed as |X| = {φ|{x| x ² φ} ⊇ {x| x ∈ X}} (that is,
|X| = {φ|∀x ∈ X, x ² φ}).
24 Since q is surjective, there is always a generator. This is natural in the ￿nite case appropriate here.
25This notion can be de￿ned on interpreted algebras, but shall only be used in the context of ordered
algebras.
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local tautology. The ￿rst case is what are called ￿beliefs￿ in Grove’s model [10]; this
set of ￿beliefs￿ may be revised if new information forces one to move to worlds where
not all of them hold. The second case corresponds what have been called ￿doxastic
commitments￿ or ￿irrevocable beliefs￿ [25]; no revision of such beliefs is admissible,
since there is no world (falling under the relation ¹) where they do not hold.
However, because the ordering only applies to the local logical structure, these
possibilities take on different meanings than in traditional frameworks. Invariably, a
￿xed language and notion of logical consequence is presupposed in the literature, so
that ￿irrevocable￿ beliefs are just the tautologies of this language. However, in the
frameworkproposedhere, wherethelanguageandthelogicarelocal, itis not necessary
that the local tautologies are tautologies of some ￿xed language (see Section 1.1); in
this sense, the believer is not modelled as omniscient. Moreover, as opposed to most
traditional models, not only the centre of the ordered algebra modelling the agent’s
belief state, but also the local tautologies, may change in time.
The local tautologies, rather than being some ￿xed set of logical truths in a strong
sense, are more adequately understood as those opinions which the agent cannot en-
visage giving up at that particular moment. Perhaps the term ‘commitments’ is ap-
propriate for them, perhaps ‘presuppositions’ is more ￿tting; both capture the idea of
acceptance without question (though the second is more amenable to change). The sen-
tences in the centre are the most preferred sentences amongst those which are in play;
assuming the traditional terminology, they shall be called (explicit, instantaneous) ‘be-
liefs’. For an ordered algebra representing the agent’s belief state, the centre will be
the set of beliefs, often denoted by K (or K(B,¹) where necessary). A generator is a
belief (such as the conjunction of elements of K) which sums up exactly the belief set.
Among those sentences which are neither beliefs nor presuppositions (nor presup-
posed false), there are two sorts. Firstly, there are those which are in play for the agent,
that is, which are contained in the interpreted algebra B. These are true in some small
worlds, but not all of the ¹-minimal ones. The ordinary method for revising beliefs in
Grove models apply to such sentences: the set of beliefs after revision by φ are those
sentences true in all ¹-minimal small worlds where φ. The ordered algebra thus rep-
resents the agent’s opinion on how he would revise his beliefs by sentences which are
in play for him at that moment. As shall be discussed shortly, this cannot be the actual
revision operation, since such an operation would have to take account of revision by
sentences not belonging to the original local language. So the ordered algebra only pro-
vides envisaged revision (or, equivalently, envisaged entrenchment of beliefs), but not a
full measure of actual revisions. Note that, since revision using a Grove order satis￿es
the G￿rdenfors postulates [9], these envisaged revisions satisfy G￿rdenfors postulates
relative to the local logical structure effective at that moment (ie. B).
Observation 2. An ordered algebra (B,φ) satis￿es the G￿rdenfors postulates relative
to the interpreted algebra B (that is, for the sentences of this algebra, and its notion of
logical consequence).
Finally, a sentence may simply not ￿gure in the underlying interpreted algebra; it
may simply be out of play. The agent has no opinions at this moment about such a
sentence. However, for the purposes of revision, it is as necessary to model the agent’s
reaction to such a sentences as it is to capture his response to a sentence of which
he is already aware. The next question is thus that of the representation of the new
information.
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2.2.2 New information
Often new information with respect to which beliefs are to be revised is treated as a
simple sentence of some ￿xed language. However, in the framework proposed here,
where no use is made of such a ￿xed language, incoming information will generally
require a local logical structure of its own, because it may involve sentences which do
not ￿gure in the local logical structure relevant for the current state of belief (Section
1.2). It was suggested that this structure be modelled as an interpreted algebra, and
this suggestion shall be retained without repeating the arguments which weigh in its
favour (￿exibility, ability to capture the context in which a sentence is learnt, and so
on). However, the interpreted algebra only models the logical structure in which the
incoming information is couched; it does not specify which sentences in this structure
are learnt, or the extent to which the sentences of the local language are to be accepted.
For example, if the local logical structure pertinent for a case where φ is learnt
is modelled as a simple algebra (Example 1), some supplementary structure on this
algebra would be needed to represent the fact that it is φ and not ¬φ which is to be
accepted. It would seem natural to represent this fact with an order on the states or
small worlds of this algebra which favours (the small world where) φ to (that where)
¬φ. So doing, one obtains an ordered algebra ￿ in fact, one obtains a simple ordered
algebra (Example 3). On the other hand, if one uses a point algebra as model for
the local logical structure, φ is automatically speci￿ed as input information, because
it is a local tautology of this algebra. But in this case too, the structure modelling
the incoming information is (trivially) an ordered algebra (the point ordered algebra,
Example 3). In the most basic cases, new information can be represented as ordered
algebra; the suggestion is that this sort of representation is appropriate in general.
Indeed, representing new information with ordered algebras inherits the advantages
of ordered algebras which have been emphasised above. As with the case of belief
states (Section 2.2.1), different statuses of the different elements of incoming informa-
tion may be captured by ordered algebras. A sentence learnt irrevocably ￿ accepted
without any envisaged possibility of challenging the new information ￿ corresponds
to a local tautology of the ordered algebra representing the incoming information (cf.
the point algebra example above).26 On the other hand, often the information acquired
comes in a context which admits that it is reliable only under certain conditions: the
information gleaned from a scienti￿c experiment, for example, does not consist of the
bare result, but a collection of conditions and assumptions relating to the details of the
experiment, which, if found to be false, would undermine the result. Such a situation is
best represented by an ordered algebra which contains not only the sentence expressing
the result of the experiment, say φ, but sentences expressing the appropriate conditions.
In such an algebra, φ is not a local tautology, since conditions are envisaged in which
the result of the experiment would be revoked. It is, however, the most preferred or
natural option: it is in the centre of the ordered algebra (cf. the case of beliefs in Sec-
tion 2.2.1). To be more pedantic, what is learnt from the experiment is characterised
precisely by any sentence which is true only in the minimal (or most preferred) worlds
of the ordered algebra ￿ that is, by any generator of the ordered algebra (De￿nition 9).
To capture revision properly, such a level of precision shall prove necessary: incoming
information shall modelled by an ordered algebra, where the sentence learnt can be
thought of as a generator of the algebra.
Finally, this representation permits ￿ thanks to the locality of the framework ￿ that
26As shall be shown in Theorem 2, and as is already clear from Example 2 and the ensuing discussion, the
notion of irrevocable revision proposed in [25] is thus recovered as a particular case.
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not all sentences of some ￿xed global language ￿gure in the ordered algebra repre-
senting the new information; such sentences are out of play in the context in which
this information is acquired. As has been noted in Section 1.2, this aspect endows the
model with the ￿exibility to capture accurately both the ￿standard￿ cases of inputs ￿g-
uring single sentences (cf. the examples of point and simple algebras discussed above),
and the more complicated cases featuring details on the conditions under which the in-
formation was acquired, possible revisions of the new information after subsequent
discoveries, and so on. Citing the latter sorts of cases, the idea of representing new in-
formation by the same type of structure as that used to model the belief state has been
proposed in the literature [19, 16]. However, it has always been done in the frame-
work of a ￿xed global language, where the idea seems less palatable: for example,
such structures determine revisions of the result of scienti￿c experiment carried out in
T￿bingen in the light of weather reports from Tahiti. The locality of the current frame-
work, and notably the fact that certain sentences may be out of play, allows the current
proposal to avoid such counterintuitive consequences.27
Technically, the representation of new information by a structure of the same sort as
that which represents the belief states (an ordered algebra) implies that the representa-
tion of belief revision should consist of an operation which takes two ordered algebras
to a third. Such a fusion operation on ordered algebras can be de￿ned from simple
operations on interpreted algebras and on orders.
2.2.3 Revision operation
Under the current proposal, both the belief state and the new information are repre-
sented by interpreted algebras with appropriate orders on them (ordered algebras); the
revision operation will somehow combine these algebras. The operation which com-
bines the interpreted algebras (local logical structures) has already been de￿ned and
motivated: it is the fusion operation ∗ of Section 1.2. The following de￿nition and ob-
servation state that the orders on the initial interpreted algebras can be mapped canoni-
cally into the fusion interpreted algebra; furthermore, the images of the orders are still
Grove orders.
De￿nition 10. For ¹i an order on the atoms of Bi, for i ∈ {1,2}, let the image of ¹i
in B1 ∗ B2, also called ¹i, be de￿ned as follows:
x ⊗ y ¹i x0 ⊗ y0 iff
½
x ¹1 x0 if i = 1
y ¹2 y0 if i = 2
Observation 3. For i ∈ {1,2}, j ∈ {1,2,3}, if ¹i satis￿es (S ¹ j), as an order on
(the atoms of) B1, then its image in B1 ∗ B2 satis￿es (S ¹ j).
It remains to specify how these orders, coming from the respective algebras, are
to be combined. There is a selection of operations which may be employed here, sev-
eral of which have been discussed in some form or another in the literature. For the
purposes of this paper, where the general framework is at issue, it would not be appro-
priate to enter into detailed considerations and debates; it will suf￿ce to pick a natural
27The best that can be done in a framework that insists on ordering worlds of a ￿xed global language is to
represent the weather in Tahiti as being independent from the experimental result (for example, at each rung
of the order, there are worlds where the weather is good, and others where the weather is bad). However
independence is not out of play: the former encompasses a certain af￿rmation concerning the relationship
between the T￿bingen experiment and the Tahiti sunshine, the latter does not. This delicate point, tangential
to the present discussion, is discussed in [13, §4.2.4] and shall be further developed in a forthcoming paper.
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candidate and develop a revision operation built on this operation on orders. Although
this candidate, and the revision operation constructed from it, has several interesting,
attractive and useful properties, let it be emphasised that other operations on orders
may prove equally useful, and may result, using a similar procedure to that carried out
below, in equally interesting revision operations. The operation on orders used here is
the lexicographic product:
De￿nition 11 (Lexicographic product). Given two orders ¹1 and ¹2 on a set S, the
lexicographic product ¹1 ×L ¹2 is an order on S with, for all a,b,c,d ∈ S,
(a,b) ¹1 ×L ¹2 (c,d) iff
½
either b ≺2 d
or b ∼ =2 d & a ¹1 c
This product has the following two useful properties. Firstly, it is non commutative:
indeed, it gives priority to one of the orders over the other. This ￿ts well with the
idea that new information should have priority over previous beliefs. Secondly, as an
operation on Grove orders, it yields a Grove order, and thus, when used to combine
ordered algebras, it guarantees that the resultant structure will be an ordered algebra.28
Observation 4. For j ∈ {1,2,3}, if ¹1 and ¹2 satisfy (S ¹ j), then ¹1 ×L ¹2
satis￿es (S ¹ j).
Therefore the fusion operation on ordered algebras, consisting of the fusion of in-
terpreted algebras (De￿nition 7) and the lexicographic product of the images of the
initial orders in this fusion, is well-de￿ned.
De￿nition 12 (Fusion ∗ of ordered algebras). Let (B1,¹1) and (B2,¹2) be ordered
algebras, and ' a presupposed identi￿cation relation between them. The fusion
(B1,¹1) ∗' (B2,¹2) = (B1 ∗' B2,¹1 ×L ¹2)
The subscript ' shall be omitted when clear from the context.
(B1,¹1) represents the initial belief state: its centre is the set of beliefs (Section
2.2.1). (B2,¹2) represents the new information: the sentence learnt is a generator
(Section 2.2.2). (B1,¹1) ∗ (B2,¹2) represents the resulting belief state: its centre is
the new set of beliefs. Note that, by the de￿nition of lexicographic order given above
(De￿nition 11), priority is accorded to new information over previous beliefs.
2.3 Properties of the model
The operator ∗, with the interpretation of ordered algebras as representations of be-
lief states and incoming information, provides a model of belief revision in so far as
it satis￿es an appropriate translation of the well-known G￿rdenfors postulates for be-
lief revision into the proposed framework. Since it satis￿es the property of categorial
matching [11] ￿ the representation of the belief state after revision (ordered algebra)
is of the same format as the representation before revision (and thus appropriate for
further revision) ￿ it is automatically an iterated revision operator; furthermore, two
important iterated revision operators proposed in the literature [25, 19, 16] can be re-
covered in the proposed framework as special cases corresponding to particular con-
straints placed on the incoming information. Finally, the proposed framework supports
an analysis of Rott’s counterexample to two of the G￿rdenfors postulates [23]. These
points shall be dealt with successively.
28Other interesting properties of this order include associativity (see Remark 4 in the proof of Theorem
2), and the fact that it commutes with quotients on interpreted algebras.
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2.3.1 G￿rdenfors postulates
In order to state the theorem detailing the postulates satis￿ed by ∗, the following pre-
liminary de￿nition is required.
De￿nition 13. Let (B,¹) be an ordered algebra with generator φ. For ψ ∈ |B|, the
re￿nement of (B,¹) with generator φ ∧ ψ is the ordered algebra (B,¹0), with
x ≺0 y iff
½
x 6 q(ψ),y  q(ψ) if x,y 6 q(φ)
x ≺ y otherwise
Where ≺ is the strict order obtained from ¹ in the ordinary way.29 This ordered algebra
has generator φ ∧ ψ.
Using the model of belief states and new information proposed in Section 2.2, with
the interpretation of the set of beliefs and sentences learnt as the centre and the genera-
tor of the respective ordered algebras, the operator ∗ satis￿es the G￿rdenfors postulates
in the following sense.
Theorem1. Let (B1,¹1) be an non trivial orderedalgebrawith centre K, let (B2,¹2
) contain sentences φ and ψ and have generator φ, and let (B2,¹3) be its re￿nement
withgenerator φ∧ψ. LetK∗φ(resp. K∗(φ∧ψ))bethecentreof (B1,¹1) ∗ (B2,¹2),
(resp. (B1,¹1) ∗ (B2,¹3)). Then30
(K ∗ 1) K ∗ φ = Cn12(K ∗ φ);
(K ∗ 2) If either, for each χ ⇔2 φ, >1 ;1 ¬χ, or >2 ⇒2 φ, then φ ∈ K ∗ φ;
(K ∗ 3) K ∗ φ ⊆ Cn12(K ∪ {φ});
(K ∗ 4) If, for each χ ⇔2 φ, ¬χ / ∈ K, then Cn12(K ∪ {φ}) ⊆ K ∗ φ;
(K ∗ 5) If, for each χ ⇔2 φ, >1 ;1 ¬χ, then K ∗ φ consistent under Cn12;
(K ∗ 6) If φ ⇔2 χ, then K ∗ φ = K ∗ χ;
(K ∗ 7) K ∗ (φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ Cn12(K ∗ φ ∪ {ψ});
(K ∗ 8) If, for each χ ⇔2 ψ, ¬χ / ∈ K ∗ φ, then Cn12(K ∗ φ ∪ {ψ}) ⊆ K ∗ (φ ∧ ψ).
where ⇒1, ⇒2, ⇒12, Cn12 and so on, are the consequence relations and sets of
consequences, in B1, B2, and B1 ∗ B2 respectively.
The G￿rdenfors postulates are normally expressed in terms of sentences and sets
of sentences (see, for example [10, §3.3]), whereas the basic notion here is that of
ordered algebra. As discussed above, ordered algebras offer a more ￿exible and general
representation of beliefs and new information; accordingly, the subtlety in Theorem 1
is required to curb this ￿exibility and recover the simpler case dealt with traditionally.
The most important aspect is the translation of the traditional notions of sets of be-
liefs and sentences learnt as centres and generators of the ordered algebras represent-
ing the belief state and the new information ((B1,¹1) and (B2,¹2)). As discussed
29x ≺ y iff x ¹ y and ¬(y ¹ x); x ¹ y iff x ≺ y or neither x ≺ y nor y ≺ x. These equivalences are
valid given transitivity and connectedness of ¹ (S ¹ 1-2).
30The postulates here have intentionally been expressed in a form analogous to those which are common
in the literature; possible strengthenings of certain postulates have been ignored.
19c °Brian Hill Towards a ￿sophisticated￿ model of belief dynamics
in Section 2.2, the interpretation of ￿belief￿ and ￿sentence learnt￿ as ￿most preferred
sentence￿ is only one of the interpretations which could be afforded to these terms by
a model consisting of ordered algebra, albeit a particularly natural and intuitive one. It
is thus important to emphasise that Theorem 1 only states that the G￿rdenfors postu-
lates are (more or less) satis￿ed when applied to the centres and generators of ordered
algebras. In particular, the postulates do not necessarily apply to the local tautologies
of the respective algebra, that is, to sentences which have been called ￿commitments￿,
￿presuppositions￿, or ￿irrevocable sentences￿ in Section 2.2. This is one concrete sense
in which the model of belief revision proposed here recovers the traditional theory as an
idealisation: the G￿rdenfors postulates hold, but only in the special cases when centres
and generators (and the corresponding notions of ￿belief￿ or ￿information￿) are being
used. Thus, this theorem shows that one of the desiderata of a more realistic model of
belief dynamics ￿ namely, to exhibit in which sense previous theories are idealisations
￿ is ful￿lled.
Several divergencies from the standard formulation of the G￿rdenfors postulates
[10, §3.3] arising from the increased generality of the proposed framework are worth
recording.
Remark 2. (i) Since all the consequence relations involved here are local ￿ relative
to particular interpreted algebras ￿ each of the G￿rdenfors postulates, in their
original form, have to be modi￿ed to specify which consequence relation is in-
volved. This factor requires particular care when specifying the ordered algebra
used to represent the new information φ ∧ ψ in axioms (K ∗ 7 - 8) ￿ thus the
appeal to the notion of re￿nement.
(ii) Given that, in the representation of new information by ordered algebras, there
may be several sentences in play, the condition stating the φ is non contradictory
(in the ordered algebra representing the belief state) concerns not only whether
or not φ itself is contradictory, but whether any sentence equivalent to it (in the
model of the new information) is contradictory. (K ∗ 2), (K ∗ 4), (K ∗ 5) and (K ∗
8) contain clauses to this effect. Furthermore, since the ￿sentence learnt￿ φ may
not be a local tautology of the ordered algebra representing the new information
(that is, ¬φ is envisaged), ∗ allows cases of revision by φ, where ¬φ is a local
tautology of the belief state, with a non trivial result. This is exactly the case
ruled out by the condition in (K ∗ 2).31
(iii) As a supplementary demonstration that the complications discussed in point (ii)
arise from the richer possibilities afforded by the liberalised representation of the
new information, note that they dissolve when these liberalisations are removed.
More speci￿cally, when a point algebra is used to represent the new information
(Example 3), the conditions discussed above are automatically satis￿ed, and the
postulates stated in Theorem 1 reduce to the standard G￿rdenfors postulates.
(iv) Recall (Observation 2) that the order on an ordered algebra de￿nes a revision
operation, with respect to sentences belonging to the algebra, which satis￿es the
G￿rdenfors postulates. As one would expect, in the case of revision by a sentence
already belonging to the ordered algebra representing the belief state, this revi-
sion operation coincides with the more general revision operation ∗; this result is
stated as Proposition 1 in the Appendix. The precise statement requires a condi-
tion relating the interpreting algebras modelling the local logical structures of the
31The original form of (K ∗ 2) is ￿φ ∈ K ∗ φ￿.
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belief state and the new information (demanding, approximately, that they have
compatible consequence relations), which is automatically satis￿ed when the new
information is represented by a point algebra. This result thus not only exhibits to
what extent the envisaged revisions agree with actual revisions, but shows once
again that, when the complexities afforded by the representation of new informa-
tion are absent, the two notions of revision coincide, and indeed reduce to the
ordinary notion known in the literature.
2.3.2 Iterated Revision
As noted above, ∗ is an iterated revision operator, in that it yields a structure (ordered
algebra) ￿t for subsequent revision (using ∗). As in the discussion of the G￿rdenfors
postulates above, the realistic credentials of this model can be further bolstered by
showing in what sense several notions of iterated revision proposed in the literature
can be recovered as special cases of revision with ∗ ￿ indeed, as special cases where
the new information comes in a particular format. The two iterated revision operators
considered, called ￿radical￿ and ￿moderate￿ revision in [22], and of which versions
have been suggested and defended in [25] and [19, 16] respectively, are characterised
by the following postulates.
De￿nition 14. (Rad) (K ∗ φ) ∗ ψ = K ∗ (φ ∧ ψ)
(Mod)
(K ∗ φ) ∗ ψ =
½
K ∗ (φ ∧ ψ) if ψ is consistent with φ
K ∗ ψ otherwise
Byrequiringthatthesentencewithrespecttowhichrevisionismadeberepresented
as coming in a particular form ￿ respectively as a point or a simple algebra (Example
3) ￿ one or other of the postulates are automatically satis￿ed.
Theorem 2. Let K be the centre of the ordered algebra (B,¹), and let consistency in
the above de￿nition be understood as it not being the case that φ ' ¬ψ, where ' is the
identi￿cation relation between ordered algebras representing the information φ and ψ
respectively. Then
(Rad) If φ and ψ are modelled by Bφp et Bψp respectively, then (Rad) is satis￿ed.
(Mod) If φ and ψ are modelled by Bφ et Bψ respectively, then (Mod) is satis￿ed.
Remark 3. As per usual in the more general localist framework adopted here, there are
several possible interpretations which can be given to the notion of ￿consistency￿: one
might ask for consistency in so far as the sentences appear as elements of the algebra
representing the initial belief state K (a condition which assumes they do appear in
this algebra), or as a relation between the sentences as they appear in the algebras
representing the new information. The second option is adopted in the statement of
the theorem; however, as can be noted from the proof, a similar result holds if the ￿rst
notion of consistency is used (see Remark 5 in the Appendix).
This theorem counts as a further illustration of the fruitfulness of this model of
belief revision, and more generally of the framework of which it is an instance (the
framework proposed in Section 1). Iterated revision operations proposed in the liter-
ature are apparently recovered as special cases of the form of the input information.
In the sense in which they suppose that the input information takes a particular form,
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they are idealisations; in the sense in which the model proposed here does not make
this supposition, and indeed can accommodate a multiplicity of possible formats for
the incoming information, it is more realistic. Although further discussion will take
us too far from the motivational purpose to which this example has been put here, it
is worth noting that the idea that the plurality of belief revision operators might boil
down to a single general operation with a plurality of formats for incoming informa-
tion is not only philosophically (and technically) interesting, but may ￿nd support, if
not a precursor, from unexpected quarters. Friedman and Halpern [7] argue for a plu-
rality of belief revision operators, each appropriate to a different ￿ontology￿; however,
given that their ￿ontologies￿ are differentiated largely by properties of the incoming
information (whether it is absolutely certain, or only has a certain plausibility relative
to other beliefs), one is justi￿ed in hoping that the plethora of revision operators may
reduce to a single, general, revision operator, and a range of possible formats for the
new information.
2.3.3 Rott’s example
The ￿nal sort of challenge for an alleged realistic model of belief revision is to account
for the apparent counterexamples to properties or postulates proposed by existing theo-
ries. Given that, as has been underlined above, the existing theories can be understood
to be idealised precisely in the sense that they only apply in special cases, a more realis-
tic model should exhibit to what extent the situations involved in the counterexamples
do not fall within the remit of the theories. A counterexample to a postulate is not
considered to be a rejection of the postulate, but rather a symptom of its limited range
of validity. This comes out clearly in the analyses of such counterexamples which are
suggested by the model proposed above.
The counterexample The counterexample which shall be taken as a test case here
was proposed by Rott [23]. It is a counterexample to the G￿rdenfors postulates (K
∗ 7) and (K ∗ 8),32 which consists of a story concerning an agent who considers the
candidates for a metaphysics post in a philosophy department. Four candidates appear
in the story: d, who is by far the best, a, who excels in metaphysics (but has no pedigree
in logic), b, who is good at metaphysics and logic, and c, who is outstanding in logic
but mediocre in metaphysics. The agent is thus originally of the opinion that d will get
the post. However, d cannot take the post, and so the agent’s beliefs will need to be
revised. Rott considers two alternative revision scenarios.
I. The agent is told (by a reliable source) that a or b will get the post; he according
revises his belief, and takes the opinion that a will get it.
II. The agent is told (by a reliable source) that a or b or c will get the post. This ￿trig-
gers off a rather subtle line of reasoning￿ [23, p230]. Given c’s pedigree in logic,
and lack of pedigree in metaphysics, the agent ￿gures that not only competence
in metaphysics, but also competence in logic, are criteria for the post. Therefore,
he reasons, b’s competence in both domains, and a’s restriction to metaphysics
alone, give b the advantage: he comes to believe that b will get the post.
32It is in fact a counterexample to a slightly weaker postulate than (K ∗ 8), but that shall not matter for
present purposes.
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This contradicts G￿rdenfors’ (K ∗ 7) in the following way.33 Without risk of con-
fusion, let a, b, c, d be the propositions expressing that a, b, c and d respectively get the
post. Let K be the agent’s prior set of beliefs. The described revision patterns yield:
K ∗ ((a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ (a ∨ b)) = K ∗ (a ∨ b) = Cn(a) (Sitn I.)
Cn((K ∗ (a ∨ b ∨ c)) ∪ {a ∨ b}) = Cn(b) (Sitn II.)
Whence K ∗((a∨b∨c)∧(a∨b)) * Cn((K ∗(a∨b∨c))∪{a∨b}), contra (K
∗ 7), which states that this inequality holds.
Analysis As the setup is described, there are basically four sentences in play ￿ a, b, c,
d ￿ which cover all possibilities and are mutually exclusive (one and only one is true).
The (minimal) interpreted algebra representing the local logical structure will contain
(essentially) these four sentences, and four small worlds, such that each sentence shall
be true in one and only one world. Without risk of confusion, the four worlds shall also
be called a, b, c and d, according to which of the sentences is true in that world. This
interpreted algebra, call it B, is the local logical structure in which the agent’s initial
belief state is couched. As the initial belief state of the agent is described (he thinks
only metaphysics is important), it should be represented by the order ¹ on B, where
d ¹ a ¹ b ¹ c.
Note that, if the information learnt in situation I. (a ∨ b) is represented as a point
algebra, the revision operation ∗ yields the desired result: a becomes the new belief
(minimal state). If, on the other hand, a point algebra representation of the information
is used in situation II., revision with ∗ yields a and not the result b given in the story.
In the proposed framework, the counterexample arises because the point algebra is not
the appropriate representation of the incoming information, or to put it another way,
the information with respect to which the agent revises is not just the bare sentence
a∨b∨c. In fact, a different representation is more appropriate, and under revision with
this representation, the G￿rdenfors postulates do not necessarily hold.
To see that the point algebra is not an accurate of the incoming information, com-
pare situation II. with situation III.34
III. The agent is told (by a reliable source) quite simply that d will not take the job.
No ￿subtle line of reasoning￿ is triggered off by this information: the agent alters
his opinion and plumps for the next best candidate. He comes to believe that a
will get the job.
Situations II. and III. yield different revisions of belief, despite the fact that the
information acquired in the two cases are equivalent in the context of the example.35
This state of affairs is reminiscent of a well-known phenomenon in choice theory, the
framing effect [27], where equivalent choice problems36 extract different choices from
agents. Here, equivalent formulations of the same input information yield different
revisions of belief. And, just as Rott’s example apparently contradicts postulates of
belief revision, the framing effect apparently invalidates axioms of rational choice.
33The case of (K ∗ 8) is similar and shall not be repeated here.
34In the conclusion of his paper, Rott alludes to a comparison with a case similar to the one described
below. A detailed discussion of the differences, and similarities, between Rott’s remarks and the analysis
proposed here lies beyond the limits of this paper.
35More rigorously, a ∨ b ∨ c and ¬d are equivalent sentences of the interpreted algebra representing the
agent’s belief state.
36Or, if you prefer: different formulations of the same choice problem.
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Given that the problem in the framing effect is that the presentation of the choice
problem plays a decisive role, a natural approach is to explicitly model the effect of the
presentation on the choice problem which the agent sees himself as faced with. Due
to differences in presentation, two choice problems which are logically equivalent will
result, after processing of the presentation, in logically non equivalent choice problems
which the agent sees himself as solving. This is the sort of tactic adopted in Kahneman
& Tversky’s prospect theory [15, 27], where the choice process involves a ￿phase of
framing and editing￿ which proceeds evaluation and indeed yields the choice problem
which the agent effectively evaluates. According to this sort of theory, the basic evalu-
ation of a choice problem is always the same ￿ and indeed it satis￿es all the traditional
rationality postulates ￿ but differences in the presentation of a choice problem may
yield logically non equivalent results of the ￿phase of framing and editing￿, and thus
different choices by the agent.
Given the considerations above, which extend beyond well-known similarities be-
tween choice theory and belief revision, Rott’s example seems ripe for this sort of
treatment.37 Comparison of the simple story in situation III. and the intricate story in
situation II. seem to suggest that, while in situation III. the incoming information (¬d)
is directly employed to revise beliefs, in situation II., the information seems subject
to a preliminary treatment before being used for revision. How else should one un-
derstand the ￿subtle line of reasoning￿ involved in situation II., if not as a phase of
pre-processing of the incoming information?
Understood in this way, the information by which the agent effectively revises in
situationII.isnotthesimplesentence a∨b∨c; inotherwords, thenewinformation post-
processing is thus not properly represented by the point algebra B{a∨b∨c}p. Rather, by
his ￿subtle line of reasoning￿, the agent establishes a preference among the options a, b
and c. A better representation of the information with respect to which he revises is an
ordered algebra whose interpreted algebra, B0, contains the sentences a, b, c, and three
worlds (also called a, b and c), each validating one and only one of the sentences and
whose order, ¹0, is such that b ¹0 a ¹0 c.38 The agent accepts as certain that a∨b∨c,
but, on re￿ection, accords a preference to b over a and c. On the other hand, in situation
III., which involves less pre-processing, the sentence ¬d is directly and simply used to
revise: the incoming information can thus be represented by the point ordered algebra
(B{¬d}p,¹{¬d}p).
In the context of the story, (B{¬d}p,¹{¬d}p) and (B0,¹0) have equivalent sets
of local tautologies. In particular, both have ¬d, or equivalently a ∨ b ∨ c, as local
tautologies: this information is irrevocably learnt in both cases. This is the precise
sense in which the two situations involve revision by equivalent information: the local
tautologies areequivalent. However, aswasunderlinedinSection2.3.1, theG￿rdenfors
postulates do not apply to local tautologies but only to centres and generators of the
ordered algebra (Theorem 1). So it is not expected that revision by these two algebras
yield the same result. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that revision by these two
algebras yield the results described in the story: a for (B{¬d}p,¹{¬d}p) (Situation
III.); b for (B0,¹0) (Situation II.). Furthermore, no G￿rdenfors postulates are violated
37The tight relationship between belief revision and choice theory has already been explored in the liter-
ature, notably in [21]; indeed Rott’s counterexample is in a certain sense the fruit of such work. However,
to the knowledge of this author, little work has been done on the relationships between the ￿realism￿ of
the postulates of choice theory and those of belief revision. This section can be seen as a ￿rst step in this
direction; further development must be left for a later work.
38This ordered algebra typically represents the result of his pre-processing / subtle line of reasoning. Other
options, containing d, or according a different preference between a and c, are equally appropriate, and yield
similar results.
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in this revision.
This analysis calls for further discussion. There are things to be said about the
relationship between the notions of local tautology and generator, and the certainty and
irrevocability of the sentence learnt. Similarly, work is required on the pre-processing
phase, in which the appropriate representation of the incoming information (ordered
algebra)isformed. Theanalysisinvitesanextensionoftheframeworktomorecomplex
forms of the incoming information, and perhaps a larger range of operators on ordered
algebra.39 Such discussion must be left for another time. Without it, a full theory
of belief revision has not been completed. It is however important to understand just
what has been already achieved by the model proposed here. It recovers traditional
postulates of belief revision and iterated belief revision and reveals in what sense they
are idealisations (they apply in special conditions). It provides an analysis of apparent
counterexamples to these postulates, in the sense that it exhibits in what sense the cases
do not satisfy the conditions required for the postulates to apply. In other words, where
traditional theories and models of belief revision cannot cope with these examples,
the proposed framework provides an understanding of them. This is an indication
of the strength of framework in so far as it is used to represent belief revision ￿ it
captures phenomena that simpler frameworks miss. Moreover, it is an indication of
the framework’s strength as a conceptual tool for studying belief revision: the analysis
of the counterexample suggests an approach towards a full theory of belief revision,
according to which the question is factorised into two parts ￿ the pre-processing part
and the revision proper ￿ of which the latter is captured by the operation ∗ and the
former may bene￿t from expression in terms of the framework proposed here.40
One can conclude that the model of belief revision proposed in the second part
of this paper is ￿realistic￿ and ￿sophisticated￿, and indeed seems to open up fruitful
possibilitiesofdevelopmentintoafulltheoryofbeliefrevision. Thegeneralframework
on which this model rests, and which was presented in the ￿rst part of this paper, has
proved promising in the case of belief revision; it would not be exaggerated to expect
similar success when applied to other questions where belief is involved and ￿realism￿
is an issue.
Proofs
Proof of Observation 1. Interpreted algebra By properties of quotients on Boolean
algebras, and the fact that ' is a congruence relation, BI/ ' is a Boolean alge-
bra. Furthermore, since ' is generated by an equivalence relation ∼ on I, BI/ '
is isomorphic to BI/∼; so it is a free Boolean algebra.
Base algebra 'q is a congruence relation, therefore B/ 'q is a Boolean algebra.
Surjective homomorphism By the de￿nition of 'q, if [φ]' = [ψ]', then [q(φ)]'q =
[q(ψ)]'q, so q' is well-de￿ned. It is straightforward to show that it is a Boolean
39For example, a similar analysis can be carried out when the situation III. is represented by a simple
algebra instead of a point algebra, if one employs a wider range of operations on, and relations between,
ordered algebra. See [13, Ch 5, Appendix A] for examples of such operations and relations.
40In the concluding discussion of his counterexample, Rott suggests that a formalisation is needed which
is suf￿ciently rich to take account of examples such as the one he proposed, whilst remaining operational
(or ￿processable￿) and eschewing gratuitous addition of information. The analysis proffered of Rott’s coun-
terexample, the simple de￿nition of the revision operation ∗, and the solid motivations and interpretations
given in Sections 1 and 2.2 seem to suggest that the model proposed here satis￿es all of these requirements.
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homomorphism. Finally, for any [x]'q ∈ B/ 'q, there is a x ∈ [x]'q and
φ ∈ BI such that q(φ) = x, by the surjectivity of q. q'([φ]') = [x]'q. So q' is
surjective.
(BI/ ',B/ 'q,q') is an interpreted algebra; furthermore, by uniqueness of quo-
tients on Boolean algebra (and of the appropriate closures of relations), it is the only
algebra resulting from these operations. The quotient is thus well-de￿ned.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ¹12 stand for ¹1 ×L ¹2 and similarly for ¹13. Without risk
of confusion, the image of the element φ ∈ |Bi| in |B1 ∗ B2| shall also be called φ.
(K ∗ 1) For any element X in the base algebra of an interpreted algebra B, |X| is
closed under the consequence relation on B, by De￿nitions 1 and 9. K ∗ φ
is such a |X| in B1 ∗ B2, so it is closed under the consequence relation for
B1 ∗ B2.
(K ∗ 2) There are two cases:
For all χ ⇔2 φ, >1 ;1 ¬χ. If B2 is trivial, the condition is trivially satis-
￿ed. Ifnot, itfollowsfromthehypothesisthat φ <12 ⊥12. Byde￿nition
of the lexicographic order, {x| x ¹12 -min} 6 q(φ), so φ is in K ∗ φ.
There is χ ⇔2 φ with >1 ⇒1 ¬χ, and >2 ⇒2 φ. B1∗B2 is trivial, and so,
by De￿nition 9, the centre K ∗ φ contains φ.
(K ∗ 3) Let θ be a generator of (B1,¹1), and consider the images of θ and φ in
B1 ∗ B2. Cn12(K ∪ {φ}) = {ψ ∈ B1 ∗ B2| θ ∧ φ ⇒ ψ} = |q(θ) ∩ q(φ)|.
There are two cases:
θ ∧ φ <12 ⊥12. Sinceq(θ)(resp. q(φ))isthe(non-empty)setof ¹1-minimal
(resp. ¹2-minimal) worlds in B1 ∗ B2, q(θ) ∩ q(φ) is the set of ¹12-
minimal worldsin B1∗B2. So K∗φ = |q(θ)∩q(φ)| = Cn12(K∪{φ});
θ ∧ φ ⇔12 ⊥12. Therefore Cn12(K ∪ {φ}) = |B1 ∗ B2| ⊇ K ∗ φ.
(K ∗ 4) Immediate consequence of the reasoning in the ￿rst case of axiom (K ∗ 3).
(K ∗ 5) Since B1 is non trivial, it follows from the hypothesis that B1 ∗ B2 is non
trivial. So there is a non empty set of ¹12-minimal worlds; since q12(⊥) = ⊥
the set of sentences true in these worlds, K ∗ φ, is consistent under Cn12.
(K ∗ 6) By De￿nition 9, if φ is a generator of (B2,¹2), and φ ⇔2 χ, then χ is a
generatorof (B2,¹2). SobothK∗φandK∗χarethecentreof (B1∗B2,¹12
), and hence they are equal (by De￿nition 9, there is a unique centre).
(K ∗ 7) There are two cases:
There is χ ⇔2 φ with >1 ⇒1 ¬χ. If B1 ∗ B2 is trivial, then the condition
trivially holds. If not, let θ be a generator of (B1 ∗B2,¹12). Since φ is
not a consequence of θ, and since ¹2 and ¹3 coincide on ¬φ (De￿nition
13), θ is also a generator of (B1∗B2,¹13). Thus K∗(φ∧ψ) = |q(θ)| ⊆
|q(θ) ∩ q(ψ)| = Cn12(K ∗ φ ∪ {ψ}).
For all χ ⇔2 φ, >1 ;1 ¬χ. Let θ be a generator of (B1 ∗ B2,¹12). There
are two cases:
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θ ∧ ψ <12 ⊥12. q(θ)∩q(ψ) is thus the (non empty) set of 412-minimal
worlds in B1 ∗ B2 where ψ holds. However, by De￿nition 13, this
is exactly the set of ¹13-minimal worlds. Therefore, K ∗(φ∧ψ) =
|q(θ) ∩ q(ψ)| = Cn12(K ∗ φ ∪ {ψ});
θ ∧ ψ ⇔12 ⊥12. Therefore Cn12(K ∗ φ ∪ {ψ}) = |B1 ∗ B2| ⊇ K ∗
(φ ∧ ψ).
(K ∗ 8) Immediate consequence of the reasoning in the ￿rst case of the second case
in axiom (K ∗ 7).
Proposition 1. Let (B1,¹1) be an ordered algebra with centre K, (B2,¹2) an or-
dered algebra with generator φ, such that the identi￿cation relation ' between B1
and B2 is total on |B2| (to every element of B2, it associates an element of B1), and
the consequence relation is preserved under this relation.41 Let K ∗ φ be the centre
of (B1,¹1) ∗ (B2,¹2) (the result of revising according to ∗), and K ∗e φ = |{x ∈
B1 | x ¹1-minimal st. x 6 q1(φ)}}| (the result of revising by the revision operation
induced by ¹1 on B1). Then, K ∗ φ = K ∗e φ.
Proof of Proposition 1. By the condition on ', B1 ∗ B2 = B1. By the de￿nition
lexicographic product, the ¹12-minimal worlds are exactly the ¹1-minimal worlds
where φ. These are just those worlds relevant for K ∗e φ.
Proof of Theorem 2. Since all the operations used to de￿ne ∗, the fusion operator on
ordered algebras, are associative, ∗ is associative. Let (B,¹),(B2,¹2),(B3,¹3) be
ordered algebras with centre K and generators φ and ψ respectively. Let φ ∗ ψ be a
generator of (B2,¹2)∗(B3,¹3), and K∗− denote the centre of the appropriate fusion
of algebras. The associativity of ∗ implies that42
(Ass) (K ∗ φ) ∗ ψ = K ∗ (φ ∗ ψ)
Remark 4. It follows that all iterated revision operators which are supported by this ∗
(as de￿ned with the lexicographic product) satisfy a formula of the form (K∗A)∗B =
K ∗ F(A,B), for some function taking pairs of sentences to sentences. This property
is called ￿right-associativity￿ in [22, §8.3].
Both the radical and moderate iterated revision operators are characterised by con-
ditions of this form. It remains to show that, when (B2,¹2) (resp. (B3,¹3)) are point
(resp. simple) algebras for φ and ψ, (Rad) (resp. (Mod)) is satis￿ed.
(Rad) By the de￿nition of point algebras (Example 3):




(Bφp,¹φp) if ψ ' φ
((B{φ},0,q0),¹0) if ψ ' ¬φ
((B{φ,ψ},1,q),¹) otherwise
where q : φ ∧ ψ 7→ > and ¹ is the only possible order. In all cases, ∗ yields
an ordered algebra with generator φ ∧ ψ; using this ordered algebra to revise by
φ ∧ ψ, (Ass) ensures that (Rad) is satis￿ed.
41For φ ' φ0, ψ ' ψ0, φ ⇒1 ψ iff φ0 ⇒2 ψ0
42As noted in Remark 1, the de￿nition of interpretation relation (De￿nition 2) extends naturally to the case
of more than two algebras.
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(Mod) By the de￿nition of simple algebras (Example 3):




(Bφ,¹φ) if ψ ' φ
(Bφ,¹¬φ) if ψ ' ¬φ
((B{φ,ψ},4,q),¹) otherwise
where 4 has four atoms, the images, under q, of φ ∧ ψ, ¬φ ∧ ψ, φ ∧ ¬ψ and
¬φ∧¬ψ, and the order imposed by ¹ is that in which they are listed. ∗ yields an
ordered algebra with generator φ ∧ ψ when φ and ψ are not contradictories, and
ψ when they are. Using this ordered algebra to revise by φ ∧ ψ, (Ass) ensures
that (Mod) is satis￿ed.
Remark 5. Examination of the proof shows that, if ψ is not a contradictory element
of B, then (Rad) and (Mod) are satis￿ed when the consistency in De￿nition 14 is
understood relative to B.43 This is another sense in which the two notions of iterated
revision are captured by this representation of the new information.
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